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1 Introduction
Revealed preference theory studies conditions under which by observing the choice behavior
of an agent, one can discover the underlying preferences that govern it. Choice rules for which
this is possible are called rational. Most of the earlier work on rationality analyzes consumers’
demand choices from budget sets (e.g. see Samuelson, 1938, 1948). The underlying premise
that choices reveal information about preferences, however, is applicable to a wide range
of choice situations. For example, applications of the theory to bargaining games (Nash,
1950) characterize bargaining rules which can be “rationalized” as maximizing the underlying
preferences of an impartial arbitrator (Peters andWakker, 1991; Bossert, 1994; Ok and Zhou,
1999; Sánchez, 2000).
In this paper, we study the implications of rationality on a class of solutions to simple
allocation problems.1 A simple allocation problem for a society N is an |N |+ 1 dimensional
nonnegative real vector
¡
c1, ...c|N |, E
¢
∈ RN+ satisfying
P
N ci = E where E, the endowment
has to be allocated among agents in N who are characterized by c, the characteristic
vector. Simple allocation problems have a wide range of applications. We discuss them in
detail in Subsection 1.1.
Our results are as follows. In Section 3, we describe a class of algorithmic rules. Such a
rule chooses an allocation for each problem (c, E) by following an algorithm which gradually
reduces each agent i’s characteristic value from E to ci. At each Step k ∈ {0, ..., n} , the
algorithm takes into account only the characteristics of k agents (that is, for each |S| = k,
defining cS as cS =
¡
cS, EN\S
¢
, the algorithm calculates xS = F
¡
cS, E
¢
).2 If there is a
feasible allocation xS (i.e. satisfying xS 5 c), the algorithm chooses it. Otherwise, it moves
to the next step.
Proposition 2 states that every rational rule is algorithmic. The converse, however, is
not true, even for continuous rules. Proposition 4 states that every rational rule which is
1Thus, as discussed in Subsection 1.1, we interpret an allocation rule on simple allocation problems as
representing the choices of a decision-maker (e.g. a public-policy maker, a tax codifier or a bankruptcy
judge).
2With an abuse of notation, we use EN\S to denote an |N \ S| dimensional vector whose every coordinate
is E.
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continuous with respect to the characteristic vector is an algorithmic rule that additionally
satisfies the following properties: first, for problems (c, E) with
P
N ci > E, the algorithm
stops at a Step k < n; second, if the algorithm stops at Step k with coalition S, then each
member of S receives his characteristic value.
Section 4 contains the main result of the paper: Theorem 1 uses the above results to
show that the Equal Gains rule uniquely satisfies rationality, continuity, and equal treatment
of equals (a fairness property which requires that agents with identical characteristics should
receive identical shares).
The literature contains other characterizations of the Equal Gains rule. Dagan (1996)
shows that this rule uniquely satisfies equal treatment of equals, truncation invariance, and
composition up.3 Schummer and Thomson (1997) show that the allocation chosen by the
Equal Gains rule minimizes (i) the difference between the largest and the smallest share
and (ii) the variance of the shares. In a related result, Bosmans and Lauwers (2006) show
that the allocation chosen by the Equal Gains rule Lorenz dominates every other alloca-
tion. Herrero and Villar (2002) and Yeh (2004) show that the Equal Gains rule uniquely
satisfies conditional full compensation and composition down.4 Finally, Yeh (2006) shows
that the Equal Gains rule uniquely satisfies conditional full compensation and own-claim
monotonicity.
Our characterization is logically independent from these previous results. Furthermore,
the main principles employed in these characterizations (such as “composition”, full com-
pensation, or Lorenz domination) are quite different than our main axiom: rationality. Also,
with the exception of Schummer and Thomson (1997) and Bosmans and Louwers (2006),
the above characterizations use properties that relate the rule’s behavior at different social
endowment levels. This is not the case for Theorem 1.
3Composition up requires that dividing the social endowment in two, first allocating one part, revising the
characteristic vector accordingly, and then allocating the rest produces the same final allocation as allocating
all the social endowment at once.
4Conditional full compensation roughly requires agents with sufficiently small characteristic values to
receive their characteristic values. Composition down deals with the following scenario: after the social
endowment is allocated, we discover that the actual social endowment is smaller; then, it requires that using
the original characteristic vector or the initially chosen allocation should produce the same final outcome.
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Our final results are in Section 5 where we first introduce two properties: translation
down and translation up. Both are concerned with the implications of translating a problem
by simultaneously changing, at the same amount, the characteristic value of an agent and
the endowment. For such translations, these properties require that the initial allocation
be translated the same way. We show, in Lemma 5, that a rule satisfies translation down
and translation up if and only if its dual rule is rational. In Theorem 2, we then use this
lemma and Theorem 1 to show that the Equal Losses rule uniquely satisfies translation down,
translation up, continuity, and equal treatment of equals.
In a companion paper (Kıbrıs, 2008), we carry out a revealed preference analysis on simple
allocation problems and study rational, transitive-rational, and representable rules. There,
we show that an allocation rule is rational if and only if it satisfies a standard property
called contraction independence (also called independence of irrelevant alternatives in the
context of bargaining by Nash (1950) and Property α in the context of consumer choice by
Sen (1971)). In this paper, we make extensive use of this equivalence.
In the next subsection, we discuss the various applications of our analysis. In Section 2,
we present our model and further discuss rational rules. In the following sections, we present
our results as summarized above.
1.1 Examples and Applications
A simple allocation problem for a society N is an |N | + 1 dimensional nonnegative real
vector
¡
c1, ...c|N |, E
¢
which, with the exception of the last application below, is interpreted
as follows. A social endowment E of a perfectly divisible commodity is to be allocated among
members of N. Each agent i ∈ N is characterized by an amount ci of the commodity. Next,
we discuss the alternative interpretations of c and E at various applications.
1. Taxation: A public authority is to collect an amount E of tax from a society N. Each
agent i has income ci. This is a central and very old problem in public finance. For
example, see Edgeworth (1898) and the following literature. Young (1987) proposes a
class of “parametric solutions” to this problem.
2. Bankruptcy: A bankruptcy judge is to allocate the remaining assets E of a bankrupt
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firm among its creditors, N. Each agent i has credited ci to the bankrupt firm and now,
claims this amount. For example, see O’Neill (1982) and the following literature. For
a detailed review of the extensive literature on taxation and bankruptcy problems, see
Thomson (2003 and 2007).
3. Permit Allocation: The Environmental Protection Agency is to allocate an amount
E of pollution permits among firms in N (such as CO2 emission permits allocated
among energy producers). Each firm i, depending on its location, is imposed by the
local authority an emission constraint ci on its pollution level. For more on this
application, see Kıbrıs (2003) and the literature cited therein.
4. Single-peaked or Saturated Preferences: A social planner is to allocate E units
of a perfectly divisible commodity among members of N. Each agent i is known to
have preferences with peak (saturation point) ci. The rest of the preference information
is disregarded as typical in several well-known solutions to this problem, such as the
Uniform rule or the Proportional rule. For example, see Sprumont (1991) and the
following literature.
5. Demand Rationing: A supplier is to allocate its production E among demanders in
N . Each demander i demands ci units of the commodity. The supply-chain manage-
ment literature contains detailed analysis of this problem.5 For example, see Cachon
and Lariviere (1999) and the literature cited therein.
6. Bargaining with Quasilinear Preferences and Claims: An arbitrator is to allo-
cate E units of a numeriare good among agents who have quasilinear preferences with
respect to it. Each agent holds a claim ci on what he should receive. For examples
of bargaining problems with claims, see Chun and Thomson (1992) and the following
literature. For bargaining problems with quasilinear preferences, see Moulin (1985)
and the following literature.
7. Surplus Sharing: A social planner is to allocate the return E of a project among
its investors in N . Each investor i has invested si. The project is profitable, that is,
5We would like to thank Rakesh Vohra for bringing this application to our attention.
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P
N si 5 E. Using the principal that no agent should receive less than his investment,
define the maximal share of an agent i as ci = E −
P
N\{i} sj. Note that
P
N ci = E.
The surplus sharing problem can now be analyzed as a simple allocation problem.
For more on surplus-sharing problems, see Moulin (1985 and 1987) and the following
literature.
8. Consumer Choice under fixed prices and rationing: A consumer has to allocate
his income E among a set N of commodities. The prices of the commodities are fixed
and thus, do not change from one problem to another. (With appropriate choice of
consumption units, normalize the price vector so that all commodities have the same
price.) As typical in the fixed-price literature, the consumer also faces “rationing
constraints” on how much he can consume of each commodity. Let ci be the agent’s
consumption constraint on commodity i. See Benassy (1993) or Kıbrıs and Küçüks¸enel
(2008) for more on rationing rules.
2 Model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents. For i ∈ N, let ei be the ith unit vector in RN+ . Let
e =
P
N ei. We use the vector inequalities 5, ≤, < . For c ∈ RN+ , α ∈ R+, and S ⊆ N, with
an abuse of notation, we write
¡
cS, αN\S
¢
to denote the vector which coincides with c on S
and which chooses α for every coordinate in N \ S.
A simple allocation problem for N is a pair (c, E) ∈ RN+ × R+ such that
P
N ci =
E (please see Figures 1 and 2). We call E the endowment and c the characteristic
vector. As discussed in Subsection 1.1, depending on the application, E can be an asset or a
liability and c can be a vector or incomes, claims, demands, preference peaks, or consumption
constraints. Let C be the set of all simple allocation problems forN . Given a simple allocation
problem (c, E) ∈ C, let X (c, E) = ©x ∈ RN+ | x 5 c and Pxi 5 Eª be the choice set of
(c, E) .
An allocation rule F : C → RN+ assigns each simple allocation problem (c, E) to an
allocation F (c, E) ∈ X (c, E) such that
P
N Fi (c, E) = E. Note that each rule F satisfies
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Figure 1: A two-agent simple allocation problem.
F (c, E) 5 c. Depending on the application, this might be interpreted as satisfying the
consumption constraints or as an efficiency requirement (as in the case of single-peaked
preferences) or that no agent be taxed more than his income. Also,
P
N Fi (c, E) = E can
be interpreted as an efficiency property or, as in taxation, a feasibility requirement or as in
consumer choice, the Walras law.
The following are some well-known examples of rules. The Proportional rule allocates
the endowment proportional to the characteristic values: for each i ∈ N, PROi (c, E) =
ciS
N cj
E. In the taxation literature, this rule is called a Linear Tax. The Equal Gains rule
allocates the endowment equally, subject to no agent receiving more than his characteristic
value: for each i ∈ N, EGi (c, E) = min {ci, λ}where λ ∈ R+ satisfies
P
N min {ci, λ} = E. In
the single-peaked allocation literature, this rule is called the Uniform rule, in the bankruptcy
literature it is called the Constrained Equal Awards rule, and in the taxation literature, it
is called the Leveling Tax. The Equal Losses rule equalizes the losses agents incur, sub-
ject to no agent receiving a negative share: for each i ∈ N, ELi (c, E) = max {0, ci − λ}
where λ ∈ R+ satisfies
P
N max {0, ci − λ} = E. In the single-peaked allocation litera-
ture, this rule is called the Equal Distance rule, in the bankruptcy literature it is called
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Figure 2: A three-agent simple allocation problem.
the Constrained Equal Losses rule, and in the taxation literature, it is called the Head
Tax. The Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) assigns equal gains until each agent
receives half his characteristic value and then uses the equal losses idea: TAL (c, E) =
EG
¡
1
2
c,min
©
E, 1
2
P
N ci
ª¢
+EL
¡
1
2
c,max {0, E −PN ci}¢ .
A rule F is rational if there is a binary relation B ⊆ RN+ × RN+ such that for each
(c, E) ∈ C, F (c, E) = {x ∈ X (c, E) | for each y ∈ X (c, E) , xBy} . Kıbrıs (2008) shows
that rationality is equivalent to the following property. A rule F satisfies contraction
independence if a chosen alternative from a set is still chosen from subsets (contractions)
that contain it: for each pair (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C, F (c, E) ∈ X (c0, E) ⊆ X (c, E) implies
F (c0, E) = F (c, E) . In the literature, this property is also referred to as independence of
irrelevant alternatives (Nash, 1950) or Sen’s property α (Sen, 1971).
TheoremA. (Kıbrıs, 2008) A rule F is rational if and only if it is contraction independent.
The following lemma is from Kıbrıs (2008). For completeness, we include the simple
proof.
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Lemma 1 A rule F is rational if and only if for each (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C it satisfies the
following properties
Property (i). if for each i ∈ N, min {ci, E} = min {c0i, E} , then F (c, E) = F (c0, E) ,
Property (ii). if F (c, E) 5 c0 5 c, then F (c0, E) = F (c, E) .
Proof. (⇒) Assume that F is rational. Then, by Theorem A, it satisfies contraction
independence. Let (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C. First, assume that for each i ∈ N, min {ci, E} =
min {c0i, E} . Let x ∈ RN+ satisfy
P
N xi 5 E. Then, x 5 c if and only if x 5 c0. Thus
X (c, E) = X (c0, E) . This implies F (c, E) = F (c0, E) . Next, assume that F (c, E) 5 c0 5 c.
Then, F (c, E) ∈ X (c0, E) ⊆ X (c, E) ,which by contraction independence, implies F (c, E) =
F (c0, E) .
(⇐) Assume that (i) and (ii) are satisfied. Let (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C be such that F (c, E) ∈
X (c0, E) ⊆ X (c, E) . Then for each i ∈ N, either c0i 5 ci or min {c0i, E} = min {ci, E} .
Let S = {i ∈ N | c0i 5 ci} . Let c00 =
¡
c0S, cN\S
¢
. Then F (c, E) 5 c00 5 c and by (ii) ,
F (c, E) = F (c00, E) . Now, for each i ∈ N, min {c0i, E} = min {c00i , E} . Thus, by (i) ,
F (c00, E) = F (c0, E) . Altogether, we obtain F (c, E) = F (c0, E) . Thus, F satisfies con-
traction independence. Then, by Theorem A, F is rational.
Property (i) of Lemma 1 is called truncation-invariance for rules on bankruptcy and taxa-
tion problems (Thomson, 2003 and 2007). Property (ii) says that a decrease in characteristic
values does not change the initially chosen allocation as long as it remains feasible.
In what follows, we will make extensive use of the equivalence stated in Lemma 1.
3 Rationality vs Algorithmic Rules
Using Lemma 1, it is straightforward to check that the Equal Gains rule is rational while
the Proportional rule, Equal Losses rule, and the Talmudic rule are not. One important
difference of the Equal Gains rule from the others is that it can be alternatively defined as
choosing the outcome of the following algorithm: let (c, E) ∈ C,
Step 1. Propose equal division of the endowment among all agents, that is, let x1 =
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EG (EN , E).6 If no agent receives more than his characteristic value, that is, if x1 5 c, stop
and let EG (c, E) = x1. Otherwise, let S1 = {i ∈ N | x1i = ci} and move to Step 2.
Step k. (for k = 2, ..., |N |) Propose to each i ∈ Sk−1 his characteristic value. (These are
agents who, in Step k − 1, were proposed a share at least as large as their characteristic
values). Propose equal division of the remaining endowment among the remaining agents,
that is, let xk = EG
¡
cSk−1, EN\Sk−1 , E
¢
. If no agent receives more than his characteristic
value, that is, if xk 5 c, stop and let EG (c, E) = xk. Otherwise, let Sk =
©
i ∈ N | xki = ci
ª
and move to Step k + 1.
In what follows, we present a property that generalizes this idea.
Definition 1 A rule F is algorithmic if for each (c, E) ∈ C, F (c, E) is the outcome of the
following algorithm:
Step 0. If F (EN , E) 5 c, let F (c, E) = F (EN , E) . Otherwise, move to Step 1.
Step 1. If there is S ⊆ N such that |S| = 1 and F ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ 5 c, let F (c, E) =
F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
. Otherwise, move to Step 2.
For k = 2, ..., |N | :
Step k. If there is S ⊆ N such that |S| = k and F ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ 5 c, let F (c, E) =
F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
. Otherwise, move to Step k + 1.
If F is not an algorithmic rule, two things can happen: either (i) the algorithm finds a
feasible allocation at some step k, but another allocation is chosen for the original problem,
or (ii) the algorithm finds multiple feasible allocations at some step k and it is not clear
which one to choose.
The Equal Gains rule is not the only algorithmic rule. Any rational rule satisfies the
property.
Proposition 2 If a rule F is rational then it is an algorithmic rule.
Proof. Let F be rational. We first show that for each pair S, T ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ C
such that FT
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
5 cT and FS
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
5 cS, we have F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
=
6Note that EN denotes a claims vector whose every coordinate is E.
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F
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
. To see this, assume FT
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
5 cT and FS
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
5 cS.
Then
F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
5
¡
cS∪T , E(S∪T )c
¢
5
¡
cS, EN\S
¢
.
By Lemma 1, F
¡
cS∪T , E(S∪T )c , E
¢
= F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
. Similarly,
F
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
5
¡
cS∪T , E(S∪T )c
¢
5
¡
cT , EN\T
¢
implies F
¡
cS∪T , E(S∪T )c, E
¢
= F
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
. Thus, F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= F
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
.
We now show that F is an algorithmic rule. Let (c, E) ∈ C. First assume that F (EN , E) 5
c. Then by Lemma 1, F (c, E) = F (EN , E) . Thus, the algorithm yields the allocation at
Step 0. Now suppose F (EN , E) 65 c.
Since F (cN , E) 5 c, there is some k ∈ {1, ..., n} such that (i) for each T ⊂ N such that
|T | < k, we have F ¡cT , EN\T , E¢ 65 c and (ii) for some S ⊆ N such that |S| = k, we have
F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
5 c. We will next show that the algorithm then stops at Step k and yields
F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
.
Because of (i) , the algorithm does not stop at any Step l < k. Note that for each S0 ⊆ N
such that |S0| = k, if F ¡cS0 , EN\S0 , E¢ 5 c, then by the first paragraph, F ¡cS0 , EN\S0 , E¢ =
F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
. Applying Lemma 1 to this unique allocation, F (c, E) = F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
,
the desired conclusion. Thus, F is algorithmic.
Surprisingly, not every algorithmic rule is rational. The following example demonstrates
this point.
Example 1 (An algorithmic rule that is not rational) Let N = {1, 2} and let f : R+ → R+
be defined as f (x) = max {0, 2x− 10}
F (c, E) =



(0, 10) if E = 10, c2 = 10
(10− f (c2) , f (c2)) if E = 10, c2 < 10, c1 = 10− f (c2)
(c1, 10− c1) if E = 10, c2 < 10, c1 < 10− f (c2)
EG (c, E) if E 6= 10.
The rule F in the example is algorithmic. The reason is, first, F (EN , E) = (0, 10) is
chosen in every problem for which it is feasible. All other problems have c2 < 10 and for
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them, F (E1, c2, E) = (10− f (c2) , f (c2)) is chosen whenever it is feasible. All remaining
problems have c1 < 10−f (c2) and c2 < 10 and the definition of an algorithmic rule does not
determine how they should be solved. The rule F is not rational since F (10, 9, 10) = (2, 8)
and F (3, 8, 10) 6= (2, 8) violates Property (ii) of Lemma 1. Finally note that F is also
continuous.
We next introduce a subclass of algorithmic rules.
Definition 2 A rule F is an algorithmic rule with boundary condition if (i) F is an
algorithmic rule, (ii) for each (c, E) ∈ C, if F (c, E) is first obtained at Step k with the
coalition S ⊆ N such that |S| = k, then FS (c, E) = cS, (iii) for each (c, E) ∈ C such thatP
N ci > E, there is k < n such that F (c, E) is first obtained at a Step k of the algorithm.
It turns out that any contraction independent and c-continuous rule is of this form. To
prove this result, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Assume that F is rational and c-continuous. Then, for each (c, E) ∈ C, i ∈ N,
and δ ∈ R+, Fi (c+ δei, E) > ci implies Fi (c, E) = ci.
Proof. Let (c, E) ∈ C, i ∈ N, and δ ∈ R+ satisfy Fi (c+ δei, E) > ci. Suppose Fi (c, E) <
ci. Then by claims-continuity, there is ε < δ such that Fi (c+ εei, E) = ci. But then,
F (c+ εei, E) 5 c 5 c+ εei, by Lemma 1, implies F (c, E) = F (c+ εei, E) , a contradiction.
We next present the proposition.
Proposition 4 If a rule F is rational and c-continuous, then it is an algorithmic rule with
boundary condition.
Proof. Let F satisfy the given properties. Then, by Proposition 2, F is an algorithmic rule.
Next, let (c, E) ∈ C and assume that F (c, E) is first obtained at Step k with the coalition
S ⊆ N such that |S| = k. Then, F (c, E) = F ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ . If S = ∅, FS (c, E) = cS is
trivially satisfied. So assume S 6= ∅ and let i ∈ S. Since F (c, E) is not obtained at Step k−1,
12
F
¡
cS\i, EN\(S\i), E
¢ 65 c. Since F ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ 5 c, this implies Fi ¡cS\i, EN\(S\i), E¢ > ci.7
Then, by Lemma 3, Fi
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= ci. Since this conclusion holds for all i ∈ S, we have
FS (c, E) = cS.
Finally, let (c, E) ∈ C be such that PN ci > E. We show that F (c, E) is first obtained
at a Step k < n. For contradiction, suppose F (c, E) is first obtained at Step n. Then, by
the previous paragraph, F (c, E) = c. But then,
P
N Fi (c, E) =
P
N ci = E <
P
N ci, a
contradiction.
For two-agent problems, any algorithmic rule with boundary condition is c-continuous.
The following example demonstrates that for larger societies, this relationship does not hold
anymore.
Example 2 (An algorithmic rule with boundary condition which is not c-continuous) Let
N = {1, 2, 3}, let ω = (3, 1, 1) , and let EGω be the weighted Equal Gains rule with weight
vector ω, defined as follows: for each (c, E) ∈ C, EGω1 (c, E) = min {c1, 3ρ} and for i ∈
{2, 3} , EGωi (c, E) = min {ci, ρ} where ρ ∈ R+ satisfies
P
N EG
ω
i (c, E) = E. Finally, let F
be defined as
F (c, E) =



EG (c, E) if c3 > 0,
EGω (c, E) if c3 = 0.
4 A Characterization of the Equal Gains Rule
The following is an important fairness notion. A rule F satisfies equal treatment of
equals if two agents with identical characteristics are always awarded equal shares: for each
(c, E) ∈ C and i, j ∈ N, ci = cj implies Fi (c, E) = Fj (c, E) . A large class of rules, including
the four central ones introduced in Section 2, satisfy this property (e.g. see Young, 1987).
Among them, however, the Equal Gains rule is the only rational rule.
Theorem 1 A rule F satisfies rationality, c-continuity, and equal treatment of equals if and
only if it is the Equal Gains rule.
7Because, by Lemma 1, F
¡
cS\i, EN\(S\i), E
¢ 6= F ¡cS , EN\S , E¢ implies F ¡cS\i, EN\(S\i), E¢ 65¡
cS , EN\S
¢
and this implies Fi
¡
cS\i, EN\(S\i), E
¢
> ci.
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Proof. It is straightforward to show that EG satisfies the given properties. Conversely, let
F be a rule that satisfies them. We next show F = EG. First note that, since F is rational,
it satisfies the two properties of Lemma 1.
Let (c, E) ∈ C. If PN ci = E, F (c, E) = EG (c, E) = c. Alternatively, assume PN ci >
E.Note that, by Proposition 4, F andEG are both algorithmic rules with boundary condition.
Step 1: For each Step k ∈ {0, ..., n− 1} of the algorithm and for each S ⊆ N such that |S| =
k, we have F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= EG
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
. To prove this, we use induction. Initially, let
k = 0. Thus, S = ∅ and by equal treatment of equals, F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= EG
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
.
Now let k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} and assume that the statement holds for each l < k. Let S ⊆ N
be such that |S| = k.
Case 1: There is l < k and T ⊆ S such that |T | = l and F ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ = F ¡cT , EN\T , E¢ .
Then, by our assumption, F
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
= EG
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
. Thus, EG
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
5¡
cS, EN\S
¢
. By Lemma 1 applied to EG, EG
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢
= EG
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
. Combining
the equalities, we then have F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= EG
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
.
Case 2: For each l < k and T ⊆ S with |T | = l, F ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ 6= F ¡cT , EN\T , E¢ .
Thus, F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
is first obtained at Step k. Since, F is algorithmic with boundary
condition, then FS
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= cS. Since F satisfies equal treatment of equals, for each
i ∈ N \ S, Fi
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
=
E−
S
j∈S cj
n−|S| . By the induction hypothesis, for each l < k and
T ⊆ N with |T | = l, F ¡cT , EN\T , E¢ = EG ¡cT , EN\T , E¢ . By assumption of Case 2, for
each l < k and T ⊆ S with |T | = l, F ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ 6= F ¡cT , EN\T , E¢ , and thus, by Lemma
1 applied to F , F
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢ 65 ¡cS, EN\S¢ . Thus, for each l < k and T ⊆ S with |T | = l,
EG
¡
cT , EN\T , E
¢ 65 ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ . Therefore, EG ¡cS, EN\S, E¢ is first obtained at Step
k. Since EG is algorithmic with boundary condition, then EGS
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= cS. Since
EG satisfies equal treatment of equals, for each i ∈ N \ S, EGi
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
=
E−
S
j∈S cj
n−|S| .
Combining this with the observations on F , we have F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= EG
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
.
Step 2: F (c, E) = EG (c, E) . First, since F is algorithmic with boundary condition, there
is k < n and S ⊆ N with |S| = k such that F (c, E) = F ¡cS, EN\S¢ . Then, by Step 1,
F
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
= EG
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
. Therefore, EG
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
5 c. Then, by Lemma 1
applied to EG, we have EG (c, E) = EG
¡
cS, EN\S, E
¢
. Combining the equalities, F (c, E) =
EG (c, E) .
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The above characterization is tight. Without rationality, Proportional rule becomes
admissible. Without equal treatment of equals, all algorithmic rules with boundary condition,
such as the weighted versions of the Equal Gains rule, become admissible. Finally, the
following example presents a rule that violates c-continuity but satisfies the other properties.
Example 3 (A rule that satisfies rationality and equal treatment of equals but not c-
continuity) Let N = {1, 2} . Let F be defined as
F (c, E) =



¡E
2
, E
2
¢
if c1 = E2 and c2 = E2 ,
(E, 0) if c1 = E and c2 < E2 ,
(c1, E − c1) if E − c2 < c1 < E and c2 < E2 ,
(0, E) if c1 < E2 and c2 = E,
(E − c2, c2) if c1 < E2 and E − c1 < c2 < E.
5 Translation Properties and Duality
We start this section by introducing two properties that require that the solution to a problem
be covariant under certain translations of the problem. Similar properties have been analyzed
in bargaining theory (e.g. see Thomson, 1981).
A rule F satisfies translation down (Figure 3, left) if for each (c, E) ∈ C, each i ∈ N, and
each δ ∈ (0, Fi (c, E)], we have F (c− δei, E − δ) = F (c, E) − δei. It satisfies translation
up (Figure 3, right) if for each (c, E) ∈ C, each i ∈ N such that ci =
P
N cj − E, and
each δ ∈ (0,∞), we have F (c+ δei, E + δ) = F (c, E) + δei. Both properties are concerned
with the implications of translating a problem by simultaneously changing, at the same
amount, the characteristic value of an agent and the endowment. For such translations,
these properties require that the initial allocation be translated the same way.
It turns out that these two properties are very closely related to rationality. The rela-
tionship is through a concept called duality. The dual of a rule F, Fd, allocates what
is available in the same way as F allocates what is missing, that is, for each (c, E) ∈ C,
F d (c, E) = c−F (c,
P
N ci −E) . Aumann and Maschler (1985) quote several passages from
the Talmud where the notion of duality is implicitly discussed and self-duality of a rule (that
is, the rule coinciding with its dual) is promoted.
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x2
c2
c1 x1
F ( c , E )
c2-d
F ( c-de2 , E–d )
d
x2
c2+d
c1 x1
F ( c , E )
c2
F ( c+de2  , E+d )
d
Figure 3: Translation down (left) and translation up (right).
The duality of rules can also be used to define a notion of duality for properties. A
property Π is the dual of another property Πd if whenever a rule F satisfies Π, its
dual rule F d satisfies Πd. Some properties, such as c-continuity or equal treatment of equals,
are self-dual. That is, a rule F satisfies c-continuity (or equal treatment of equals) if and
only if its dual F d satisfies the same property.
The following result shows that translation down and translation up are, together, the
dual of rationality (or equivalently, contraction independence).
Lemma 5 A rule F satisfies rationality if and only if its dual F d satisfies translation up
and translation down.
Proof. First assume that F satisfies rationality. Then it satisfies the two properties of
Lemma 1.Let (c, E) ∈ C, i ∈ N, and δ ∈ (0,∞).
Claim 1. F d satisfies translation down. To see this, assume δ 5 F di (c, E) . Let E =P
N ci − E. Then, δ 5 ci − Fi
¡
c, E
¢
implies F
¡
c, E
¢
5 c− δei 5 c. Then, by Property (ii)
of Lemma 1, F
¡
c− δei, E
¢
= F
¡
c, E
¢
. This implies F d (c− δei, E − δ) = F d (c, E)− δei.
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Claim 2. F d satisfies translation up. To see this, assume ci =
P
N cj − E. Let E =P
N ci − E. Then, min
©
ci, E
ª
= E = min
©
ci + δ, E
ª
. Then, by Property (i) of Lemma 1,
F
¡
c+ δei, E
¢
= F
¡
c, E
¢
. This implies F d (c+ δei, E + δ) = F d (c, E) + δei.
Next, assume that F d satisfies translation down and translation up. Let (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈
C.
Claim 3. F satisfies Property (ii) of Lemma 1. Assume F (c, E) 5 c0 5 c. Let A =©
j ∈ N | c0j < cj
ª
. If A = ∅, F (c0, E) = F (c, E) trivially holds. Alternatively, let i ∈ A. Let
δ = ci − c0i and E =
P
N ci − E. Then Fi (c, E) 5 ci − δ implies δ ∈ (0, F di
¡
c, E
¢
]. Thus,
by translation down, F d
¡
c− δei, E − δ
¢
= F d
¡
c, E
¢
− δei. This implies F (c− δei, E) =
F (c, E) . Applying the same argument to each i ∈ A, we obtain F (c0, E) = F (c, E).
Claim 4. F satisfies Property (i) of Lemma 1. Assume for each j ∈ N, min {cj, E} =
min
©
c0j, E
ª
. Let A =
©
j ∈ N | c0j < cj
ª
, B =
©
j ∈ N | c0j > cj
ª
, and c00 =
¡
c0A, cN\A
¢
. By
Claim 3, F (c00, E) = F (c, E) .Wewill next show F (c0, E) = F (c00, E) . IfB = ∅, this trivially
holds. Alternatively, let i ∈ B. Let δ = c0i− c00i and E =
P
N c
00
j −E. Note that c00i = ci. Then
min {c00i , E} = min {c0i, E} implies E 5 c00i . Thus, c00i =
P
N c
00
j − E. Then, by translation up,
F d
¡
c00 + δei, E + δ
¢
= F d
¡
c00, E
¢
+ δei. This implies F (c00 + δei, E) = F (c00, E) . Applying
the same argument to each i ∈ B, we obtain F (c0, E) = F (c00, E). Together, F (c0, E) =
F (c, E).
Claims 3 and 4, by Lemma 1, imply that F is rational.
The following result is a corollary of Theorem 1 and Lemma 5. It also uses the fact that
the Equal Gains and Equal Losses rules are dual rules (e.g. see Thomson, 2003).
Theorem 2 A rule F satisfies translation up, translation down, c-continuity, and equal
treatment of equals if and only if it is the Equal Losses rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that EL satisfies the given properties. Conversely, let F
be a rule that satisfies them. We next show F = EL. By Lemma 5, F d satisfies rationality.
Since c-continuity and equal treatment of equals are self-dual properties, F d also satisfies
them. Thus, by Theorem 1, F d = EG. Since EG and EL are dual rules, then, F = EL.
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